Commercial shuttle--more info read nasaproblems.com

NASA Problems and Solutions Saving NASA Don A. Nelson Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer ~ Aerospace Consultant   Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com   September 2012 This blog comment sums up the NASA problem… 1.   "Perhaps the single biggest threat to the nation's space program in the next decade is the repeated, rampant multi-billion dollar cost overruns that plague big NASA projects. The senior leaders of NASA and its big contractors repeatedly deliver projects billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule. And to add insult to taxpayers' injury, they revise history to obscure the truth. The James Webb Space Telescope, the scientifically important successor to Hubble Space Telescope, is going to somehow get support from Congress despite its explosive price tag, well documented mismanagement, and half-decade launch delay." nasawatch.com/archives/budget/ If NASA is to survive the looming financial crisis the following problems and solutions must be addressed:   NASA Management Solutions …The first NASA priority is to solve the management problems Space Launch System …Why the SLS must be cancelled…too many fatal flaws. Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Deathtrap …The Orion MPCV is not ten times safer than shuttle. Commercial Space Shuttle …The only feasible and realistic 21st century space transportation system. Space tugs to Space Cruisers …Star Trek plan for deep space transportation. NASA Technology Issues …NASA is technologically bankrupt. China’s Space Shuttle …Why China will be forced to develop a space shuttle. Letters of Concern …Should the NASA’s administrator resign because of shuttle mismanagement? Solutions to NASA Management Problems  “I think it's fair to say that there's been a sense of drift to our space program over the last several years” President Barack Obama NASA’s ongoing inability to meet schedules, control costs, and prevent cancellation of projects is caused by their unwillingness to resolve the agencies internal problems. Internal problems that have been festering for years and must be addressed before NASA can again significant contribute to expanding mankind’s knowledge of the space frontier. This report identifies the problems and recommends solutions to stop the “drift to our space program” into oblivion. Identifying the problems: ·        NASA has dysfunctional management. The “One NASA” problem has never been solved and each NASA center continues to operate like an independent “fiefdom”. Program costs soar because there is no accountability for failure. The objective is get the program funded with the belief that Congress will provide for cost overrun rather than cancel the program. ·        Manned spaceflight operations cost are excessive and consume too much of NASA’s resources. NASA has no incentive to reduce manned launch operation costs. NASA must get out of the launch operation business. ·        Technology development programs have been neglected for decades and NASA today is technologically bankrupt. The cancelled “Apollo on Steroids” Constellation Program and the floundering Space Launch System’s development problems are the results of trying to build a 21st century space transportation system with 20th century technology. NASA Management Solutions: The President makes three political appointments to NASA: the Administrator, Assistance Administrator, and the Inspector General. Too often these appointees are unwilling or unprepared to challenge the NASA civil servant senior managers who have their own agendas. Senior members of Congress with NASA oversight also contribute to the problem when they use their position to promote agendas that conflict with the strategic plan for the agency. The agency’s entrenched senior management resistance to change is a major factor why many qualified candidates from outside the agency refuse to accept political appointments to NASA. NASA Administrator Must have the unique qualification of a Washington politician, engineer, scientist, and program manager with the ability to determine what passes the test of being both feasible and realistic. The Administrator must have “independent” advisors who can challenge the “entrenched” NASA civil service managers. The general rule in today’s NASA is to tell the Administrator what you want him to hear and not what he needs to know.    NASA Inspector General The NASA Inspector General Office has the NASA oversight responsibility; however this office is plagued by internal dissension that forces an “appointed” Inspector General to go along to get along with the civil service staff. The office’s technical evaluation capability is virtually nonexistent. The Inspector General must have outside independent evaluator(s) on technical issues. The Inspector General must also identify to the Administrator those project managers whose management decisions created program problems. In general, accountability of senior management doesn’t exist at today’s NASA. The President must appoint a NASA inspector general whose background knowledge relates to the agency…not just government career bureaucrats. To have accountability, there must be responsible oversight. NASA Office of the Chief Engineer This office must become the “eyes and ears” for the Administrator. The NASA chief engineer must be the administrator’s must trusted advisor. The Office of the Chief Engineer must have the resources to serve as the agency’s independent internal evaluator of proposed projects and the capability to monitor the existing projects. Each NASA’s center chief engineer office must serve as the coordinator agent for using the resources of their office in evaluating that center’s projects and report directly to the Headquarter Chief Engineer. They will have no allegiance to the center directors or project managers. All evaluations will be public record. The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA Chief Engineer will be the most effective mechanism the Administrator can have. The Office of the Chief Engineer would be used as the training ground for future executive program managers for Senior Executive Service positions. Invaluable management experience can be obtained by appointing promising candidates to the Chief Engineer Office and rotate them around the various centers to gain insight into program management and each center’s capability. NASA’s management creditability problems can be attributed to the lack of extensive experience in project management. This process solves that inexperience problem and addresses the “One NASA” issue by creating a NASA senior management team with knowledge and a relationship with other NASA centers. NASA Advisory Council The NASA Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory” council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent unbiased advice for the Administrator. Public input to the Council is not permitted and that must be corrected. Council members have been removed for issuing opinions unfavorable to the Administrator position. This policy has been detrimental to the agency. The NASA Advisory Council must be appointed by the executive branch and report to the President and Congress and not be subservient to the NASA administrator. The Council must also serve as forum where NASA employees and contractor can voice concern on NASA programs and policies without fear of management reprisal. NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel This panel effectiveness has been negated by the appointment of members with limited technology knowledge. For Example: Safety Experts Call for Shuttle Shutdown (Source: Orlando Sentinel , 4/17/2009) Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S. exploration program by squeezing available resources,” the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel said in its latest annual report, released Thursday. The panel was created by Congress after the 1967 Apollo 1 launch pad fire killed three astronauts. These are the same “experts” that said they “didn’t do tech analyses” when requested to investigate the safety of Ares I. Their call for shuttle shutdown was based on a non-existence safety evaluation of the two transportation system. It is recommended that membership on the ASAP consist of aerospace engineers and they not be appointed by the NASA administrator. NASA Credibility Issue GAO: The GAO said NASA missions faced "persistent cost growth and schedule slippage." Little seems to have changed. Since 2006, NASA has broken the bank on 10 of 12 major projects. RETURN TO HOME PAGE Supporting Documentation of NASA Management Problems: GAO: NASA Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects Date Released: Monday, February 1, 2010 Source: Government Accountability Office Full report What GAO Found GAO assessed 19 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than $66 billion. Of those 19 projects, 4 are still in the formulation phase where cost and schedule baselines have yet to be established, and 5 just entered the implementation phase in fiscal year 2009 and therefore do not have any cost and schedule growth. However, 9 of the 10 projects that have been in the implementation phase for several years experienced cost growth ranging from 8 to 68 percent, and launch delays of 8 to 33 months, in the past 3 years. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to invest billions in the coming years in science and exploration space flight initiatives. The scientifi c and technical complexities inherent in NASA's mission create great challenges in managing its projects and controlling costs. In the past, NASA has had diffi culty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for many of its projects. The need to effectively manage projects will gain even more importance as NASA seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. This report provides an independent assessment of selected NASA projects. In conducting this work, GAO compared projects against best practice criteria for system development including attainment of knowledge on technologies and design. GAO also identified other programmatic challenges that were contributing factors in cost and schedule growth of the projects reviewed. The projects assessed are considered major acquisitions by NASA--each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million. No recommendations are provided in this report; however, GAO has reported extensively and made recommendations on NASA acquisition management in the past. GAO has designated NASA's acquisition management as a high risk area since 1990. Thanks to cost overruns and poor management, the cost of the James Webb Space Telescope has risen from $3.5 billion to $8.7 billion and its launch has been delayed until 2018. The canceled Mars missions were cooperative projects with European scientists that would have sent two probes to the Red Planet — one to analyze gases in Mars' atmosphere; the other, a rover, to search the Martian surface for signs of life. Internet Blogs: ” I’m a young person at NASA and can’t stomach the Old Guard. They shut out our POVs in ways that you can’t even being to imagine. I have seen far too many good young folks dinged on their performance appraisals and told “no good deed goes unpunished.”. I hope to continue to help cultural change and use the circumstances to speed it along.”   The JSC managers cannot save themselves. They appear to have forgotten their responsibilities to their people, their program, and the nation. Auditor, after auditor, after auditor, after auditor has found the same three problems at the root of every NASA project that's blown its budget by billions of dollars and its schedule by years. The space agency and its big contractors issue lowball cost estimates that assume superhuman ability to leap technological hurdles, no unexpected surprises and cost-savings not backed up by historical performance. Yet, it seems the agency keeps bringing forward the same kind of shoddy forecasting on costs. In tight economic times, that just isn't going to work with a Congress looking for "luxury" items to cut from a budget with ballooning deficits.   E-mails from NASA Engineers: -----Original Message----- From: xxxx Sent: Monday, April xx, 2007 To: xxxxx Subject: Ares I/Orion  xxxxx, don't blame us at MSFC.  We didn't dream that d___ thing up.  It was a gift from two astronauts at Houston, via Headquarters, that wanted a quick (spelled safe) replacement for the Shuttle.  Seems they thought it was getting too risky to fly.  And I will assure you that it did not take any great analyses to determine that we had been presented with a pig-in-a-poke.    Don, I agree that CEV (Orion MPCV) has problems -- BIG problems. You know how that works-- we'll spend enough money to commit the nation to it and by the time the real cost comes out it will be too late and the CEV will either be finished with limited capability, or the money needed to fully complete it will be provided. You know that's how it works and so do I.   Media releases:   Griffin fires back at advisors August 23, 2006 at 6:26 am · Filed under NASA Several days after three scientists resigned (or were asked to resign) from the NASA Advisory Council, administrator Michael Griffin fired back at the members, and scientists in general, in a memo, ScienceNOW reported late Tuesday. “The scientific community… expects to have far too large a role in prescribing what work NASA should do,” Griffin told NAC members in a memo obtained by ScienceNOW. “By ‘effectiveness,’ what the scientific community really means is ‘the extent to which we are able to get NASA to do what we want to do’.” And if NAC members disagree with NASA’s approach? “The most appropriate recourse for AC members who believe the NASA program should be something other than what it is, is to resign. ”Harsh language, and language that is unlikely to win much support from the scientific community, although former NAC members like Wes Huntress were firing back. Saying that the advice that he and fellow former members Charles Kennel and Eugene Levy was “simply not required nor desired,” Huntress added that the current council “has no understanding or patience for the science community process.” One suspects that we have not heard the last in this clash between NASA leadership and scientists. Ref: http://www.spacepolitics.com/2006/08/23/griffin-fires-back-at-advisors/ NASA Chief Lashes Out at Parochialism By BRIAN BERGER Space News Staff Writer posted: 05 March 2008 12:20 pm ET GREENBELT, Md. -- NASA Administrator Mike Griffin took scientists and contractors to task March 5 for doing end runs around the U.S. space agency's established priorities to secure startup funding for their pet projects. Speaking at the Goddard Memorial Symposium here, Griffin said NASA loses credibility when scientists, contractors and the agency's own entrenched parochial interests downplay the cost and technical challenges of a proposed project in order to win congressional support. "Anyone here knows that once started, any given mission is nearly impossible to cancel," he said. Griffin said everyone loses when groups and individuals pursue their own self-interest without regard for the bigger picture.  "The rift and harsh rhetoric between the proponents of robotic science and human spaceflight as far as I can tell increases no one's budget, does not increase the overall budget, does not help our nation's space efforts one iota, but does cause division and divisiveness that weakens us," he said. Griffin said NASA has lost credibility with its political stakeholders and the public at large. "This is a matter of integrity for our community," Griffin said. "NASA managers, the White House and Congress have seen this behavior too many times and the agency has lost a great deal of credibility over the decades as a result. There was a time...when what NASA said could be taken to the bank. Anyone here think it's like that today?" Griffin called on the space community to censure groups and individuals who put their interests ahead of the space program as a whole. "If we wish a better reality for tomorrow we as a community need to police this behavior. Those who engage in it must be made to feel and must be unwelcome in the community at large," he said. "My hope for today is that there will in the future be more respect for each other's work." ======================== What Does the NASA Advisory Committee Actually Do? By Keith Cowing on March 5, 2012 6:22 PM. 3 Comments       Keith's note: I had planned on listening in on the NASA Advisory Council's Education and Public Outreach Subcommittee meeting today via Webex. But I changed my mind and decided that it would be a waste of time - time better spent on doing real work (and cleaning out my garage). I am not sure that what the NAC or any of its subcommittees does or says actually matters in any significant way. NASA clearly ignores them. The NAC is actually rather passive (more so than ever in the past) and never actually says anything strategic or insightful. And they never, ever push NASA hard on the things that are clearly screwed up. Bolden Invokes Inverse Washington Monument Ploy By Keith Cowing on March 29, 2012 10:14 AM. 44 Comments NASA administrator warns agency may have to cut 'everything' but top 3 priorities if no budget deal "NASA Administrator Charles Bolden warned Wednesday that, unless Congress reaches a deal with the White House to avoid mandated budget cuts next year, NASA would have to cancel all of its other missions to keep its three top priorities moving forward." "I am confident James Webb will make a (scheduled) 2018 launch," Bolden said. "What if there is a sequester?" asked U.S. Sen. Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., chair of the budget subcommittee. That was a reference to automatic spending cuts that will start in 2013 if no new budget deal is reached this year. Bolden said he is "confident that Congress will avoid that," but NASA has not "taken a hard look at what would be the result" of a sequester. Bolden said NASA would likely have "to put all our funds on the priorities and forget everything else." =========================================== NASA’s Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program (SLS/MPCV) will fail because…mission costs are too high, the MPCV crew module has an unsolvable water recovery issue, there is no commercial application and no cargo return to earth capability. The following SLS/MPCV “operation” cost estimates were presented to the Congressional Budget Office after it failed to make the Congress aware of the prohibitive cost to operate expendable heavy lift vehicles. ·         The NASA human exploration budget will be flat lined at $2.8b for the foreseeable future. One report indicates a development cost of $38b and another reports that the first development version launch of the SLS could not take place until December 2017 and the 130mt production versions (crew and cargo) are not expected to unveiled until August 2032. This SLS development program scenario based on 13 flights over a 21 year period would have extreme difficulty maintaining the manufacturing labor force for such a low flight rate. However, it is the introduction of the cargo vehicle which forecast that it will require two launches of these mammoth vehicles to accomplish one mission. The SLS is the same heavy lift launcher concept used in the Constellation program which was cancelled because: "The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources.” Such is the case today. ·        NASA has failed to reduce the mission operation cost of the SLS/MPCV. The following $4.2b estimate of annual operations cost for the SLS indicated it will cost more to manufacture the expendable vehicles, plan the mission, and conduct flight operation than NASA has budgeted for human exploration. THIS IS A VERY CONSERVATIVE SLS LAUNCH COST ESTIMATE CONSIDERING THE OPERATIONAL LAUNCH RATE WILL BE LESS THAN TWO PER YEAR. NASA is assuming that future budgets will be increased to cover mission operations. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN!   SLS/MPCV Operational Launch Cost Estimate FY 2010                                            Manned Launch                                     $ mil Flight/Launch Contract Labor Cost (11,000 total workforce JSC,MSFC,KSC) 1375 SRB (2) 5 segment 160 Civil Service   250 1st stage tanks 75 1st stage engines (5 RS-25E) 200 2nd  stage (tank) 10 2nd stage engine ( 3 J2-X engines) 70 GFE 30 Logistic 87 Misc. ( fuel,range,etc.) 77 Orion MPCV 450  Total Manned Launch 2,784 Cargo Launch SLS manned cost less flight/launch labor fixed cost and MPCV 709 Lander (cargo) 730 Total Cargo Launch 1,439 Annual Operation Cost ~ Two Flights/YR Total 4,223 Flight/Launch Labor Cost – space shuttle labor cost for mission planning and flight preparation was reduced to an operational level of 16,500 employees in 2004.  Constellation work force was assumed to be 6,000 which were unrealistic for support from three NASA centers. For the SLS/MPCV an optimistic mission operation contractor workforce of 11,000 was used. Salary only (no benefits) cost to NASA would be $125k per employee for an annual fixed cost of $1.375b plus benefits.. SRB (2) 5 segment – Thiokol had a manufacturing workforce of 1400 for shuttle and an engineering/staff support of 490. Using the lower $125k for the Thiokol workforce makes the annual labor cost for four 5 segment SBR’s to be $60m each. It will be extremely difficult to manufacture only four 5 segment SRB’s per year for less than $80m each. Civil Service – Civil service oversight and support for shuttle was at 2000 employees in 2004. This number was use for this evaluation even though CS would have considerable more oversight responsibility for five different SLS configurations, SLS, MPCV, crew habitat module, and landers) with five different primary propulsion systems. Fixed annual cost is estimated to be $250m. 1st stage tanks - The shuttle external tank production operations used 703 employees. However another 1300 employees charged to the tank production for engineering support, facilities, and quality control. If this number of production support employees could be reduce to 300 and material cost limited to $10m the tank cost could be reduced to $75m. Not an impossible goal. 1st stage engines (5 RS-25E) – The cost for the shuttle SSME engine (RS-25D) in 1989 was reported to be $38m. Considering inflation the cost and the reduction in non-reusable engine cost, the RS-25E was assumed to cost $40 per engine. 2nd stage (tank) – A tank cost of $10m assumes the 2nd stage tank can be built by the same labor force as the 1st stage tank. Cost includes materials and transportation to KSC. 2nd stage engines - (3, J2-X engines) – Reported to cost $24m each. GFE – $87m was based on shuttle cost for government furnished equipment such as crawler transport. Logistic - $77m was based on like shuttle charges for base maintenance as related to operations. Misc. - $42m for range support, crew/capsule recovery, fuel, etc. Orion MPCV - The Apollo CSM had a unit price of $77m in 1972, in 2010 $ that is $429m.  Each ATV cost about $304 m according to ESA and the Japanese HTV spacecraft production cost is reported to $220m. A conservative unit cost for the MPCV is $450m.  Lander – Constellation program had a per unit lander cost of $730m. -------------- ·        The SLS/MPCV does not have a worthwhile mission objective. The MPCV’s 21 day mission duration limitation is 609 days short of being a Mars transportation vehicle. Missions to near earth asteroids are currently being conducts by robotic spacecraft at a fraction of the SLS/MPCV mission cost. The MPCV does not have a space shuttle type airlock making EVA extremely dangerous.  ·        There are no commercial or military applications for the SLS/MPCV which could reduce annual operations cost. ·       NASA’s annual space technology budget of $1b is too small and too dispersed among too many organizations to provide any significant improvement in space transportation for the SLS/MPCV. “It’s the Launch Cost…Stupid”… paraphrasing Bill Clinton’s presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its launch cost and the commercial space shuttle is the only option! The SLS/MPCV shuttle replacement plan is unaffordable, unsafe, and like the Constellation program suffers from incompetent NASA management. It take five SLS vehicles configurations to accomplish what one privatized shuttle fleet can accomplish! =============================== Crew Modules are Death Traps NASA Management has chosen not to disclose that these crew modules have unsolvable safety issues that are inherent to all crew modules with parachute water landings and crew recovery. There is historical evidence that substantiates crew modules have been no safer than the space shuttle. In fact it is by chance that the crew module safety record is not much worst. NASA management has chosen to disregard the perilous “entry” phase of flight where Soyuz cosmonauts were killed when their crew module failed during retry and the recent near fatal mishaps…all related to manufacturing errors.  Every flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) or any of the commercial crew modules will be a “test flight.” Orion Crew Module Crash Site Remember one of reasons the space shuttle was decommissioned was to improve crew safety and that is not the case with crew modules! Ironically only a privatized space shuttle can have crew escape pods that would protect the crew during every phase of flight. This is another NASA management blunder. Recently published statements attributed to NASA state that the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: “designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space Shuttle.” As a retired NASA engineer with extensive experience in the operation of crew modules, I challenged the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance about the authenticity of this statement.  Their reply (see below) was the Orion failed to meet the safety requirements for entry during their Constellation Program evaluations and that they have failed to establish a Level 1 set of requirement for the commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV. It is my opinion that the Commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV are potential deathtraps and NASA has misled Congress about the safety of these vehicles. While the crew escape tower on the MPCV may provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew escape pods, it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a death trap during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the Russian Soyuz crew module’s safety record is not significantly better than that the Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the escape tower, it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be the fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures are:   ·        Every crew module flight is a test flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred.   ·        Crew modules have very limited cross range capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable weather conditions. ·        Crew module’s notorious reentry errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid access to the crew in dire circumstances. ·        Parachutes are known to fail. This is another unacceptable single point failure. There are too many potential failures with fatal consequences for a crew module to be considered for 21st century human space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service only because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting body winged runway landing crewed spacecraft. Email reply: Excerpts from NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance: “At PDR, the Cx (Orion) design PRA estimate was better than the requirement for ascent and not there yet for entry. We don’t have a set of level 1 requirements yet for the next NASA developed human system, but we do plan to use the Cx numbers above as part of our human rating requirements set for commercial crew to ISS.  I agree this will be a challenge for any capsule for all the reasons you give if not more.” RETURN TO HOME PAGE ============================================ The Space Transportation Plan for the 21st Century Commercial Space Shuttle and Space Based Fleet “To get somewhere... we have to know where we’re going!” NASA MUST HAVE A FEASIBLE AND REALISTIC LONG RANGE SPACE TRANSPORTATION PLAN. WITHOUT “THIS” PLAN THE AGENCY WILL CONTINUE TO STAGNATE! ·        REDUCE THE COST OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS BY DEVELOPING A COMMERCIAL SPACE SHUTTLE FLEET (See: Commercial Space Shuttle Revival and Privatization). ·        REDUCE COST OF NEAR EARTH/DEEP SPACE TRANSPORTATION BY DEVELOPING A SPACE BASED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM(S) DESIGNED TO SUPPORT ROBOTIC, HUMAN, MILITARY, AND COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION NEEDS AND TO BE OPERATED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR (See: Space Based Transportation Plan). ·        RESTRUCTURE NASA AS AN AGENCY FOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND SCIENCE EXPORATION. It is mandatory that this nation’s 21st century space transportation system reduce launch operations costs. The two keys factors for reducing launch cost operations is the removal of NASA (government operations) from the control of space flight operations and introducing reusable vehicles for launch, near earth, and deep space transportation. This space transportation plan is an evolutionary process for establishing reusable launch and space based vehicles. In the near term existing expendable space transportation vehicles would supplement space transportation requirements. This is the only viable concept that can provide a feasible and realistic launch system in the foreseeable future. Its development is a mandatory requirement to provide a safe human transportation system. Key to this plan is the long range roadmap that provides direction to NASA and the aerospace community. The development schedule will accelerate or decrease as the needs for exploration requirements dictate. Unlike the SLS/MPCV, the CSS provides a stair step approach outlining the strategic plan for four decades. To get somewhere…we’ve got to know where we’re going.” The funding available may cause the schedule to vary, but the direction is clear. Commercial Space Shuttle Revival and Privatization There has been an extensive undertaking to reduce the cost of expendable launch vehicles but their launch costs are still too high. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space shuttle operations. It is not too late to revive the space shuttle fleet. The shuttle orbiter airframes Atlantis at KSC and Discovery at the Smithsonian can be retrofitted to commercial configuration until new orbiters can be built.   Competitive Commercial Space Shuttle (CSS) launch cost can be achieved by: ·        Use the existing Orbiter airframes and install modular quick replaceable subsystems. ·        Removing onboard piloting functions to allow unmanned mission operations. ·        Removing all civil service launch operations support. ·        Consolidation of launch and mission operations at the launch site. ·        Automation of ground and flight operations. ·        Shuttle assembly at launch pad. ·        Eliminates cost plus fixed price contracts. ·        Establishing international launch operation cooperation.   Reducing commercial space shuttle launch cost is not a technical challenge…it is a political challenge.   The following chart shows the breakdown where significant cost reductions can be achieved by privatization of the space shuttle operations: As indicated above the two remaining CSS high cost systems are the solid rocket motors (SRM) and the external tank (EXT TK). Removing thrust nozzle gimbaling would significantly lower SRM cost and removing titanium from the external tank would also lower launch cost.   What is the Commercial Space Shuttle (CSS)? The CSS uses the orbiter airframe, external tank, and SRM boosters. The orbiter is updated with subsystem components that are quickly replaceable modules to reduce vehicle turnaround time. Computer software and hardware is upgraded and the vehicle is operation without inflight piloting requirements. Crews will be flown only on missions requiring their support for onboard payloads or to be transferred to space based vehicles. On crewed missions the crew escape pods will be installed. The entry thermal protection system will have on orbit repair capability and advanced X-37 program improved tiles. Pad assembly of the space shuttle will also reduce operations cost and turnaround time. Rapid turn-around is a unique CSS feature and which supports the military requirement and provide the capability of timely intercepts of asteroids/comets that may impact earth. Commercial Launch Market for CSS The predicted average commercial medium to heavy launches for the next ten years is 11 per year. The CSS has the potential to capture a majority of these launches by offering the unique capability of satellite on-orbit checkout before release and returning faulty satellites for repair. Once the space tug is operational satellites can be serviced on-orbit or retrieve. The CSS can offer tourist flights to reduce cost of cargo delivery.    Space Launch System/Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Versus Commercial Space Shuttle     SLS/MPCV CSS Launch Cost 130 mt /crew to LEO $2.78b $2.1b Development Cost Estimate $11.5b $2.4b Operational Availability 6 Years 4 years Crew Safety Poor Good Commercial Applications No Yes Payload Return Capability No Yes Maximum Launches/Year 2 12 Military Applications No Yes Space Based Support Possible Yes Vehicle Upgrade Potential Limited Excellent Launch Fails Mission Fails Yes No   Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods This is the only viable crew escape/safe haven system and is available only on the CSS. ·       Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods ·        The orbiter mass property issue is resolved by removing the piloting functions to provide weight margin for the pods (~ 3,700 pounds). Escape pod weigh is 700 pounds per pod. The pods provide protection for all phases of flight. At launch pad and lower altitudes escapes, a ballute deploys to slow the pod for parachute deploy. The pod’s life support system provides on-orbit safe haven in the event the cabin pressure is breached. Target lifetime for life support is 20 days to allow for on-orbit rescue. Pods are located behind the nose cone heat shield wake to reduce excessive thermal loads in the event of a Columbia type entry failure. The pod is also equipped with a heat shield system. The pod must be a “smart pod” ... it must have knowledge of the environment. The crew escape pod is the key to reducing the shuttle operations cost and providing safe access to space for the astronauts. To install the pods requires weight be removed from the cabin area or the forward center of gravity limit would be violated. The only function in the cabin area that is not required for flight operation is the piloting function. All piloting functions can be automated. Automated flight has been conducted for all phase of flight operation. Removing the piloting subsystems (commander and pilot weight, seats, forward flight deck displays and control systems, escape pole, forward windows, etc. ) provides a weight margin of nearly 3,700 pounds that can be used to install the escape pods. The only major roadblock is the steadfast objection of NASA’s spaceflight management to carrying astronauts on automated space vehicles. This is an inbred management policy that has festered in the human space programs for far too long! Space Based…  Space Tug to Space Cruiser The first step to a “Star Trek Enterprise” space cruiser is the unmanned space based tug. NASA’s future is in the development of these space based vehicles to be operated by the commercial sector…not in obsolete heavy lift launch vehicles. The space transportation system for the 21st century must be developed as an evolutionary process using "space based" vehicles. The initial space based vehicles would be small unmanned vehicle supporting robotic missions. The development schedule for large crewed spaced based vehicles will accelerate or decrease as the funding and needs for space exploration requirements dictate. Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS! Tugs can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions. Russian Space Based Tug This proposed Russian vehicle called the Parom is a space based inter-orbit “tug”. The Parom will rendezvous with launch vehicles, retrieve their payload and transfer them to other in orbit vehicle or to higher orbits. Future space based tugs can conduct the following missions at significantly reduce operation cost and reduced chance of mission failure. Space Based Transportation Plan 1.) Must be capable of carrying a payload to a geosynchronous transfer orbit or of placing a payload directly into geosynchronous orbit. It would place and retrieve payloads in geosynchronous orbits, transfer materials to and from space station and space platforms, retrieve reusable space hardware, and deorbit expended space debris. 2.) Have the capability to store propellants on-orbit for a duration that provides adequate mission performance margins. This duration will be defined by the launch frequency capability of the automated Space Shuttle II or supporting launch vehicles such as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV). 3.) Be designed for on-orbit payload transfers, consumables replenishment, and maintenance. 4.) Be designed with the goal of being a baseline configuration for a space based lunar transfer vehicle. 5.) Serve as an orbiting test bed facility for next generation deep space propulsion systems. Justifications: 1.) Space based vehicles are the logical and mandatory requirement in the establishment of a baseline concept for a cost efficient advanced space transportation systems. A space based vehicle concept would initiate the ground work for a permanent deep space transportation system. Lifetime of these vehicles would be expected to be 10 to 20 years and therefore would significantly reduce the cost of deep space transportation. 2.) Development of space based vehicles provides an exciting and meaningful endeavor for NASA and its contractor employees. 3.) Space based vehicles will reduce the increasing orbital debris problem. 4.) The low earth orbit payload delivery capability of the commercial Space Shuttle and EELV’s would be significantly increased. (The inert weight of the expendable upper stage would not have to be orbited and would be available as payload weight.) 5.) Provides a test platform for testing and recovering hazardous advance concept space engines (nuclear, toxic, etc.). 6.) Of particular interest is the capability to provide affordable access to unmanned space commercial laboratories and space manufacturing facilities. Comments: 1.) It is not realistic to believe that the space based upper stage program can be developed without government support. However, the government (NASA and the DOD) must not be the operator of the flight system for commercial applications. 2.) The Defense Advanced Research Projects agency (DARPA) is already considering a space based autonomous space transporter and robotics orbiter (ASTRO) to transfer propellant from orbiting fuel dumps to spy satellites. RETURN TO HOME PAGE ========================================== China’s Space Shuttle The China National Space Administration (CNSA) can be expected to introduce a reusable space shuttle transportation system by 2020. The program is designed Project 921-3 and is convincing evidence that CNSA understands that at 21st century space program must be based on reusable space vehicles with capability to launch and return crew and cargo from spaced based facilities. With a space shuttle and spaced based infrastructure China will become the dominate space faring nation.   In October 2006 the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) revealed that China is developing a winged space shuttle for use in the 2020 time frame.[9] Concept images indicate the planned space plane may be about 2/3 the size of the U.S. and Russian space shuttles. But instead of a using a large fuel tank that powered launch engines in the space plane, it uses a separate three-part liquid fuel booster. Four Are Charged in Espionage Cases Tied to China By Evan Perez  Companies Featured in This Article: Boeing WASHINGTON -- The Justice Department unveiled charges against a U.S. military analyst and a former Boeing Co. engineer in separate cases that officials said underscore intense economic and military espionage efforts by China in the U.S. The unrelated cases, filed in Los Angeles and Alexandria, Va., center on allegations that sensitive information about the Space Shuttle and Delta IV rocket programs, as well as U.S. military sales to Taiwan, were exposed to Chinese spies. USAF X-37B The third mission of the X-37B is schedule for October 2012. The success of this “automated” space vehicle will force the Chinese to develop an automated space shuttle. RETURN TO HOME PAGE ========================================== Key Technology Development NASA is technology bankrupt. For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a technology development program. Without advancement in technology there will be no advancements in aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of development technology during the program development contributes to excessive cost and program failures. Technology development must become NASA first priority. Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines: ·        Propulsion Systems ·        Structural Material ·        Electrical Power Systems ·        Avionics ·        Manufacturing Tooling Systems ·        Also see the author’s book. In the late 1980’s NASA established technology teams in the above disciplines comprised of NASA employees and members of the aerospace community to identify and prioritize technologies need for future programs. No funding was ever provided for the technology programs. These technology working groups must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail. Propulsion Systems: The existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is provided by chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines and solid rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems have reached their maximum performance potential. However significant cost reductions for this class of engines can be achieved with the development of reusable engines for launch vehicles and the development of propulsion systems for space based vehicles. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In addition space based propulsion systems would require the development of a long duration propellant storage system. NOTE: The space shuttle main engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. That technology must not be lost. The long range advance propulsion technology concepts have a wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for long range consideration are: Solar Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust. Sunlight Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in space to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for their propulsion force. Nuclear Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is used to heat the liquid hydrogen. Anti-matter—Collides a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton with a negative charge that produces a tremendous force for propulsion. Plasma Rocket—hydrogen gas is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by magnetic fields to provide thrust. The long range propulsion technologies will be extremely challenging to develop and will require extensive laboratory research testing. Structural materials—technologies are needed to decrease the structural weight of space vehicles. Carbon nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous potential for space structures. They are light weight and stronger than existing spacecraft materials. The tubes also have the potential to solve the storage and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes can only be produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be assigned to the development and large scale production of this material. Research is required for materials to replace the shuttle thermal protective system. Ceramic materials for engine components also have shown promise. Electrical Power Systems—are limited to the capability of batteries, solar arrays, and nuclear power generators. Extensive research is required in all these areas. Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove hypergolic generator from flight systems.  Avionics—will present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health monitoring and autonomous control system of reusable space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of software and sensors. Autonomous navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors, thermal actuators, and optical devices are resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy, and reduce operations costs. Manufacturing Tooling Systems- Advanced materials for future space programs must have machines that can process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign countries with low labor cost has diminished this nation capability to made manufacturing tools. There is an acute need for machines that process existing and advance materials which allow U.S. companies to produce products that can compete in the market. RETURN TO HOME PAGE LETTERS of CONCERN… Should the NASA Administrator Resign? The following correspondent with NASA administrator Charles Bolden was an attempt to make him aware the SLS program is unsafe and unaffordable and that only a commercial space shuttle endeavor has the capability to support NASA’s 21st century launch and payload return needs. Instead it verified that NASA management still used conjecture to support their conclusions. There is no documentation at NASA that confirms that a privatized space shuttle was ever evaluated as the launch system for deep space human and robotic endeavors. Administrator Bolden should have evaluated the commercial space shuttle, but instead he used conjecture to justify the development the SLS. History will record this as an attempt to preserve the “marching army” civil service human launch operations which in the end will lead to the demise of NASA.      Bolden $20 Bet March 5, 2010 NASA Headquarters Office of the Administrator Attn: Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr.  Subject: $20 “Plan B” Bet   Charlie, The Commercial Space Shuttle is the only option for the “Plan B” manned spacecraft heavy-lift launch vehicle compromise. It solves the launch gap problem, has the least development cost, is commercially operated, provides the highest level of safety with crew escape pods, has proven heavy lift capability, provides the only heavy payload return capability, and has the lowest mission operation cost. History will record that NASA management ignored requests to evaluate the commercial space shuttle as the lunar heavy lift vehicle before proceeding with their disastrous Ares Orion launch system. The hand writing is already on the wall that the Chinese space program will have a reusable space transportation system and therefore must have a space shuttle. Will history record that it was on your watch that this nation conceded human space exploration to China? Gave the attached supporting data to Mike Coats at JSC, bet you $20 that it will never reach your desk unless Mike sends it to you. Don Don A. Nelson Nelson Aerospace Consulting Retried NASA Aerospace Engineer   NASA REPLY (NOT BY BOLDEN): National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters Washington, DC 20546-0001 April 1, 2010 Space Operations Mission Directorate   Mr. Don A. Nelson Nelson Aerospace Consulting 1407 Moller Road  Alvin,TX 77511 Dear Mr. Nelson: Thank you for your recent letter to our National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Administrator, Charlie Bolden, proposing that NASA consider developing a Commercial Space Shuttle as the only Plan B option for a heavy-lift launch vehicle. After discussing your proposal and enclosures with Mr. Bolden, I have a few observations and comments to share. Although NASA does not have a Plan B, we are actively developing the technology, tools, and safety enhancements to make a future mission to Mars both realistic and achievable. Key to that effort will be a reliable heavy-lift propulsion system. Your letter suggests that lower operations costs can be achieved by turning the Space Shuttle over to a commercial entity. A sound business case, however, would be highly dependent on market demand beyond potential NASA requirements. Various studies and surveys, such as the annual commercial space transportation market forecast published by the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space, indicate that there is not projected growth in the launch market. For the United States (U.S.) launch vehicle services, the market is primarily for U.S. Government payloads. Consequently, there may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle. NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request includes funding for a broad scope of Research and Development (R&D) activities aimed at developing next-generation space launch propulsion technologies. These activities aim to both reduce costs and shorten development timeframes for future heavy-lift systems. More specifically the R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research. Hopefully this brief explanation gives a little more insight into understanding NASA's forward plan. Thank you for your continued dedication to human spaceflight and crewed vehicle safety enhancements. These are noteworthy contributions and your comments are greatly appreciated. Lynn Cline for William H. Gerstenmaier Associate Director for Space Operations   Nelson’s reply to Bolden: Email dated April 8. 2010 Charlie: Ms. Cline's reply to the Commercial Space Shuttle option typifies the disconnect between NASA's senior management decisions based on conjecture and decisions made on unbiased engineering analyses. In her letter she states: 1) “There may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle.” The United States had lost its profitable commercial space launch market before the downturn in the satellite launch business. Our space launch industry is dependent on government support for its survival. However, while significant efforts were made to lower the operation cost of the privatized expendable launch vehicles (EELV’s), none were made for the reusable space shuttle even though a NASA JSC study report that: “Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. (Ref.: “Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle”, Space Shuttle Program Office, Sept. 28, 2001). 2) “The R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.” Exhaustive launch propulsion systems evaluations have proven again and again that no significant improvements in the performance of first stage chemical engines can be achieved. In other words, we’re stuck with what we got. In-space advance engine development can best be conducted if the engine can be tested in space and returned for evaluation. Only the space shuttle has heavy cargo return capability. 3) “NASA does not have a Plan B.” While there may be no Plan B, NASA is investigating a heavy launch vehicle (HLV) space transportation solution for the failed Ares Orion launch system.  The HLV’s will cost a minimum   $11 billion to develop, has no commercial applications, has no cargo return capability, and fails to solve the launch gap. The HLV like the Constellation program requires two launches to lift 66 MT to LEO for a seven day manned lunar mission. The existing space shuttle and EELV space transportation systems can deliver the same cargo mass to LEO and avoid the launch gap and loss of thousands of shuttle jobs. Using the space shuttle and EELV eliminates the HLV development risk and cost. A commercial space shuttle further reduces operations cost. The commercial space shuttle and EELV are the better candidates for establishing a human space based transportation system for lunar, deep space, and Mars missions. A space based transportation system is mandatory for human space exploration. To continue on the Apollo expendable vehicle concept path invites failure and disaster. In addition there is a safety issue associated in transporting astronauts to and from LEO in space capsules that has not been addressed. The Soyuz capsule has experience two fatal incidences. Warning signs of another catastrophic Soyuz capsule failure are becoming increasingly alarming. The commercial space shuttle not only significantly lowers the cost of mission operation, it can provide crew escape pods. Has NASA forgotten that crew safety is their number one priority? I strongly recommend that NASA have an unbiased external evaluation of the commercial space shuttle and EELV space transportation system…due diligence is mandatory in this nation’s critical stage of human space exploration. Once again Charlie…this is happening  on your watch. Don Don A. Nelson Nelson Aerospace Consulting   Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer 1407 Moller Road  Alvin, TX 77511 RETURN TO HOME PAGE March 30, 2011 The Honorable Barack H. Obama President of the United States The White House Washington, DC  20500 Subject: Presidential Directive Request for a Commercial Space Shuttle Dear Mr. President: There now are three failed attempts by NASA management to design a replacement vehicle for the space shuttle: Admiral Craig Steidle’s “fly off” concepts, the Ares I Orion, and the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. All three failures were based on archaic expendable vehicles concepts. Furthermore NASA management has misrepresented the safety of an expendable crew module in which every launch is a “test” flight and the reentry phase with no crew escape system has been a death trap on too many flights.  These obsolete and costly expendable vehicle concepts are the product of the NASA management cultural impasse that has been perpetuated by the incompetent oversight of the Executive Branch offices of the NASA Inspector General and Office of Science and Technology Policy. NASA management’s belligerent refusal to accept that their expendable rocket and crew concepts are unaffordable and unsafe will continue until cancelled by an executive directive. NASA management has steadfastly refused to evaluate the commercial space shuttle. It does not take a rocket scientist to know that a reusable commercial vehicle is more cost effective and safer. Mr. President, the commercial space shuttle is the only option for an affordable 21st century reusable and “space based” transportation system. Only a presidential directive can make this a reality. Don A. Nelson Nelson Aerospace Consulting (retired NASA engineer)   NO REPLY TO THIS LETTER!   LLLLLLLLLLLL The NASA Office of the Inspector General was requested to investigate the commercial space shuttle. It is their charter of responsibility to investigate NASA projects. The following FOIA reply confirms they have ignored this responsibility: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Inspector General Washington, DC 20546-0001 Mr. Don A. Nelson 1407Moller Alvin, TX 77511 SUBJECT:      Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request I am responding to your September 9, 2010, FOIA request for Inspector General documentation of any investigation that "confirm[s] the current plan to develop a heavy lift launch system and/or purchase commercial launch services will be safer and more cost effective than the spaceflight transportation system using the existing space shuttle vehicles." The OIG has no records responsive to your request. However, for information about Shuttle costs and retirement, you can access our audit report, Review of NASA's Progress on Retiring the Space Shuttle Program (IG-10-012), at the NASA OIG web site, http://oig.nasa.gov/. You have the right to appeal this initial determination to the Inspector General. Under 14 CFR § 1206.605(b), the appeal must: (1) be in writing; (2) be addressed to the Inspector General, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546; (3) be identified clearly on the envelope and in the letter as an "Appeal under the Freedom of Information Act"; (4) include a copy of the request for the Agency record and a copy of the contested initial determination; (5) to the extent possible, state the reasons why you believes the contested initial determination should be reversed; and (6) be sent to the Inspector General within 30 calendar days of the date of receipt of the initial determination. Jim Morrison Assistant Inspector General for Audits OIG FOIA Officer – Audits RETURN TO HOME PAGE   NASA Politics Buried Shuttle Privatization Report In response to the 107th Congress’s request to investigate privatizing the space shuttle program (SSP), NASA issued the following: “CONCEPT OF PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM” //s/Ronald D. Dittemore 9/28/01 Ronald D. Dittemore September 28, 2001 Manager, Space Shuttle Program Summary It is believed that utilization of the Space Shuttle for human access to space will continue through at least 2015 and possibly beyond 2020. The longevity and operational aspects of this program demand a different approach to operational management for the future. A different management strategy needs to be employed. Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical. The continuing erosion of NASA skills and experience threatens the safety of the program. It is critical to take advantage of the existing NASA SSP expertise before further erosion affects the ability to plan and safely implement privatization. Today, the skill and knowledge legacy still remain to formulate the appropriate merger of the NASA SSP and private industry.   NASA REJECTED THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS AND SENT OUR FUTURE IN SPACE TO MUSEUMS!   Summary: NASA management refused to evaluate the Commercial Space Shuttle because they knew it would terminate their government launch operation activities at MSFC, KSC, and JSC. Is NASA management guilty of space shuttle mismanagement?   ============== Author Biography Don A. Nelson is an aerospace consultant and writer. Mr. Nelson has consulted with congressional and government offices on NASA issues since his retirement from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the agency. He has made numerous media appearances on national and foreign television. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique knowledge of NASA’s problems and for seeking feasible and realistic solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr. Nelson is the author of: “NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions” by Don A. Nelson Written by a retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of the space program's current problems. Not only does it predict the most recent shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles, no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and action...or lose the hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review). Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent!” RETURN TO HOME PAGE OCT - 5 2010