BrianM | April 20, 2011 2:00 PM | ReplyWhat is missing are the grand strategists and visionary leaders of the earlier generations.
In the beginning there was Tsiolkovsky. Later Noordung (Potocnik) really gave us many of the plans and rationale for what to do in space and on a space station. Then there were Ley and Oberth. Many people put von Braun into this category, though really he was more a popularizer of those who preceded himself (popularizing and public engagement is also a very important job, though current NASA management does not recognize it as such).
The last attempt at a strategy was George Mueller's shuttle, the concept for which originated with Noordung in WWII, but which Mueller started talking about in 1968; virtually all of the great 60s leaders in manned space flight, by 1968 or 69, were in agreement that a flyback vehicle which could be reused in order to save on manufacturing costs was a necessity. It was a necesity because they needed something to replace Saturn and Apollo, which were unaffordable, and it was a necessity because they needed something to loft the modular components of space platforms since without a Saturn they had no other way. The Shuttle that was built wound up being pretty close to what was envisioned in terms of functionality, but the big problem was that it was too expensive and took too much time to turnaround between missions.
In large measure because of the expense and preparation time, Shuttle never turned into the DC-3 it was intended to be. It was more like a Boeing 247; not really practical.
The Vision of 2004 was an attempt at a strategy, and it is the best thing we have, but no one ever laid out the requisite steps within the Vision. The first step NASA should have turned to was an R&D effort, to use and improve upon what was learned on the Shuttle; the big strategic mistake was in not trying to improve on Shuttle's performance and reduce its expense by moving towards an improved Shuttle 2.
I think that Admiral Steidle may have been on that path, but when Griffin came in he tossed it all aside in an effort to try and re-create Apollo. Apollo was never sustainable or affordable and it wasn't with Constellation either.
Basically most of the senior experienced people were tossed aside, and for Constellation a bunch of mid-career inexperienced people all anxious to show they could lead were brought in to carry out Griffin's wishes. No one dared to speak up to Griffin and tell the emperor he had no clothes. And it seems like none of these people ever thought about whether what they were doing was the right thing to do in the first place. So the idea of strategy was lost. We've not yet recovered from this today.
We are still focused on an Orion,which has a questionable mission and questionable design, and which is seemingly taking decades to develop even though it involves no newtechnology. There is something wrong with this picture and yet no corrective measures have been taken.
This is also a failure of leadership.
If you take a look at today's human space flight "leaders" (I use the term loosely), absolutely none of them have any serious experience at developing anything new and different, and absolutely none of them have shown themselves to be visionary leaders. Those who have any experience have been mired in the day-to-day focus of implementing an 'operational' flight program and most have probably never sat back to think about tactics, strategy or policy. A sure sign of non-visionary managers are people who point fingers towards Congress or the President and who say 'we're just doing what they want'; as though the Congress or the President are going to show visionary leadership in space exploration.
Tactics would have been ensuring the Shuttle is maintained until a replacement is ready. Tactics would have been ensuring that the systems experts on Shuttle would have been gathered together to define what was needed in a follow-on Shuttle II that could improve on cost and performance. Tactics would have looked at an Orion and said, OK, if we are doing another capsule (a throwback) as an interim replacement, how do we get it into orbit in 3 years so that at least it meets our near term needs?
Strategy would have been defining how Shuttle, Orion, and Shuttle II fit into the Vision.
Policy would have been defining whether commercial entities had a role and in what areas. NASA leadership would have/should have been laying all of this out and embracing it, and telling the Congress and the President, this is the Vision, and this is how we can make the Vision happen. O'Keefe defined the Vision by January of 2004; he showed some real leadership; and Bush spelled out the Vision but there has not been any subsequent work to carry it out.
So now NASA has lost the ability to field a Shuttle II; Orion is so far behind required plans and schedules that a lot of negative learning is going on with it. There is no transportation capability whether interim or permanent, to replace Shuttle, and won't be for several years. There is some hope that a couple of the commercial contenders might do better in re-establishing technical capabilities both with capsules and with fly-back vehicles. NASA is leaderless and has nothing beyond the 2004 Vision to point to. There is no stated or embraced strategy, or a plan, or a mission.
Some of us, who thought we were the senior experienced and visionary leaders, are still out here, and we are watching what is happening, but we have little or no voice. We've been marginalized. We are watching to see whether NASA human space flight can survive and whether anyone can put together a meaningful plan.
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