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Begin forwarded message:
From: "Nelson Aerospace" <caae@wt.net>
Date: March 2, 2015 at 9:59:25 AM CST
To: "bobbygmartin1938@gmail.com"@imta-38.everyone.net, "Audrey Schwartz \(NAL\) Rivers" <asrivers@gmail.com>
Cc: "Andrew Barron" <arb@rice.edu>, "Bob Holkan" <bob.holkan@gmail.com>, "Charles Harlan" <charsyzygy@sbcglobal.net>
Subject: NASA Crew Safety OIG Investigation Request
Would you sent this investigation request to our concerned colleagues and ask them to contact the NASA IG and ask why his office is remaining silent on this dire Orion safety issue.Don Nelson===============================From: Don NelsonSent: Wednesday, February 04, 2015 6:13 PMSubject: NASA Crew Safety OIG Investigation RequestNelson Aerospace Consulting
1407 Moller Rd
Alvin Texas, 77511
February 5, 2015
Office of Inspector General
Paul K. Martin, NASA Inspector General
NASA Headquarters
Mr. Martin:
The NASA Space Shuttle was decommissioned because it was perceived to be unaffordable and unsafe. To promote the SLS/Orion launch system NASA released a statement that the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Crew Vehicle will be ten times safer than the space shuttle. At the January 2014 meeting of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel I presented evidences that the Orion crew module has an unsolvable entry safety issue. While the Orion launch abort system does provide crew escape for launch there is no way to provide a crew escape mode during entry for crew modules. After review the ASAP issued the following statement in their 2014 annual report: "(ASAP) expresses concern that the Loss of Crew probability thresholds for them (SLS/Orion) are not significantly safer than the actual historical performance of the Space Shuttle." Would the Space Shuttle have been decommissioned if it was known that the replacement would not be significantly safer? Since the NASA Commercial Program proposed vehicles will both be crew modules configurations they will also be no safer than the Space Shuttle. The dismal safety record of crew modules was a known fact. The OIG is requested to investigate if the misrepresentation of Orion crew safety was an act of duplicity or management incompetence.
Shuttle upgrades studies for unmanned shuttle flights during the 1990 timeframe concluded that the vehicle could be safely flown without onboard piloting. Also determined was that sufficient weight (piloting equipment: displays, seats, windows, etc., ) could be removed to allow crew escape pods to be installed. Crew escape pods provide an escape mode for all phase of flight. If crew escape pods had been installed on the Challenger and Columbia orbiters, it is highly probable those crews would have survived. NASA management steadfastly rejected shuttle escape pods because it eliminated piloting. Which ask the questions, is crew safety NASA's number one priority? The OIG is requested to investigate if the failure to install crew escape pods was an act of duplicity or management incompetence.
The affordability of the Space Shuttle was addressed by this engineer while I was a civil servant at NASA JSC. My studies showed that privatization of the Space Shuttle significantly reduced launch cost. My efforts to promote shuttle privatization resulted in two written reprimands for not being a team player. In 2001 a Shuttle Program Office privatization study mandated by Congress concluded, "Privatization of the Space Shuttle has the potential to provide significant benefits to the government." As late as 2012 a study for a commercial space shuttle freighter incorporating existing technologies would have the capability to compete commercially with foreign launch services, provide the military with the capability for rapid launch service to combat foreign and asteroid /comets threats, and support NASA launch requirements for LEO and manned/unmanned deep space mission. This could be accomplished at a fraction of the cost for developing and operating the SLS vehicles (see webpage: spacetran21.org ). Privatization of the NASA's launch services threaten the "job programs" created at the NASA JSC and KSC facilities and NASA has no incentive to reduce launch costs. The OIG is requested to investigate if the failure of NASA management to privatize the Space Shuttle was an act of duplicity or management incompetence.
NASA's management of the human space endeavors over the last two decades has at best, been dismal. Program cancellations, cost overruns, and schedule slippage are common occurrences. The nation's reliance on the Russian government for our human access to space is unforgivable. The cancellation of the Constellation Program was the result of incompetent management and there are warning signs the SLS Program is following the same path. The objective of these OIG investigations is to identify that NASA has a serious management cultural problem that must be addressed.
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retired NASA aerospace engineer
NOTE: Also sent by priority mail
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
ASAP 0114
To: NASA Aerospace Safety and Advisory Panel
Written statement to the ASAP on January 23, 2014:
Request for ASAP Recommendation that the Space Launch System be Cancelled Due to Unsolvable Safety Issues.
My name is Don A. Nelson and I am a retired NASA aerospace engineer. I served in the Mission Operation Directorate where I evaluated concepts for advanced human space vehicles and before that assignment I worked on the Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle programs in the Mission Planning and Analyses Division. It is the failure and misinterpretation of analyses in NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) program that have resulted in unsolvable safety issues that I will address today.
The SLS is presented as being affordable, sustainable, safe, and will be the vehicle used for human transportation to Mars. However, analyses indicate that none of the SLS goals can be achieved. An extremely optimistic estimate for the development of the SLS Mars transportation system is $62 billion and the projected cost for one human Mars mission initiated no earlier than 2030 is $14 billion. In a vibrant economy these costs may seem affordable; however what makes the SLS program unaffordable is that it has the same flaw as the cancelled Apollo program. It has no capability to pay down the mission operations cost by returning ore resources from the moon, asteroids, or Mars and will therefore be cancelled after a few exploration missions. History has taught us that it was the quest for resources (gold, spices, etc.) that perpetuated the exploration and settlement of the Americas. The SLS does not have the capability to return sufficient quantities of these resources to the earth's surface. Only a space shuttle and space based transportation vehicles can meet this requirement. Without cargo return capability, the current robotic systems can explore Mars at a fraction of the cost of the SLS program. The space science community is being denied funding in order to support the SLS program which in the final analysis is not sustainable. The human space community realizes that SLS will take decades to develop and if ever successful will have a short lifetime. This has created a serious morale issue and when you have morale problems you have safety problems (see enclosed NASA engineer emails).
NASA release 11-164 states the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, "is designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the space shuttle". In actuality the Orion crew module and all the commercial crew modules are potential death traps because they have no escape systems (pods) for the re-entry phase of flight. I challenged the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance on the authenticity of this release (See attached: NASA Orion Safety Declaration). Their reply indicated they were unaware of this release and confirmed that the Orion crew module had failed to meet the Constellation preliminary design requirements for entry. Without crew escape pods, crew modules will never be safe and there is no feasible way to install crew pods in crew modules. However, analyses shows that crew escape pods can be installed on a commercial space shuttle (http://nasaproblems.com/). Had crew escape pods been installed on the two shuttle disasters, it is highly probable the crews would have survived.
NASA human space flight management has steadfastly refused to evaluate the logical path for advancing human space transportation…the commercial automated space shuttle freighter. The safety issues with the orbiter tiles are being resolved (Dream Chaser, X-37B, China space shuttle program). Commercial space shuttles can be designed to provide competitive commercial launch service and support Earth's future requirement to obtain deep space resources. Historians will conclude that the only reason NASA management refused to adopt the commercial autonomous space shuttle was their cultural belief that only they can safely conduct human space missions.
Before this nation can advance the frontiers of space, we must reduce the prohibitive cost of mission operations. The commercial space shuttle freighter addresses this issue and with crew (passenger) escape pod provides a significant improvement in safety. Proceeding with the SLS program only invites certain failure and an unacceptable crew risk. Therefore it is requested that the ASAP issue a recommendation that the SLS be cancelled.
Don A. Nelson
Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
Supporting Documentation
NASA Engineer's Emails to Don Nelson
I have blocked out this engineer's name. It's been my experience that those who challenge NASA's human space program management can expect reprimands. It is not uncommon to be approached by NASA and contractor engineers asking that I make their concerns public. Don A. Nelson
From: D. A. Nelson [mailto:nasaproblems@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 2, 2013 4:47 PM
To: XXXX XXXXX
Subject: SLS Orion All HandsXXXX
I didn't see you at the SLS Orion all hands meeting last Tuesday? I emailed a question asking what was the estimated cost for launch operation, but they refuse to consider my question...My estimate is a conservative $2.8b for the 70mt with Orion.
Don
From: XXXX
To: 'D. A. Nelson' <nasaproblems@yahoo.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 2, 2013 6:18 PM
Subject: RE: SLS Orion All HandsDon,
I don't go to all-hands meetings anymore. What a waste of time.
Hope things are going well for you,
XXXX
From: D. A. Nelson [mailto:nasaproblems@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, May 3, 2013 8:18 PM
To: XXXX XXXXX
Subject: Re: SLS Orion All HandsThings are good for me...the retirement check still comes in. You're not the only one not going to all-hands...less than 200 people there...in my day we over flowed the auditorium.
take care
Don
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: XXXX XXXXX
To: 'D. A. Nelson' <nasaproblems@yahoo.com>
Sent: Friday, May 3, 2013 8:28 PM
Subject: RE: SLS Orion All HandsDon,
NASA needs its collective head examined.
In your day, we had serious managers with (mostly) serious politicians to manage the agency. Today we have a bunch of half wits.
Charlie Bolden is an embarrassment to the agency. He should have resigned years ago. Probably will go down in history as THE most ineffective administrator ever. Last year we lost Mike Coats—he was one of the best. I don't know about the new one we have. So far I haven't been impressed, but maybe I'm not giving her a chance.
Part of what really grinds my gears is that the upper level management sits there and feeds us a line of bunk: "We have a bright future ahead of us. We have asteroid missions, Orion, and Mars. JSC is doing SWELL!" Kind of like a French waiter bringing you a pile of horse shit on a silver platter and saying, "Bon apetite!"
The least they could do is level with us. We need a RIF at NASA really bad. Way too much "make-work" going on to keep idle hands busy. Nero fiddled as Rome burned.
You know the rest.
XXXX
///////////////////////
NASA Orion Safety Declaration:
Michael Braukus/J.D. Harrington
Headquarters, Washington
202-358-1979/5241
michael.j.braukus@nasa.gov j.d.harrington@nasa.gov
May 24, 2011RELEASE : 11-164
NASA Announces Key Decision For Next Deep Space Transportation System
WASHINGTON -- NASA has reached an important milestone for the next U.S. transportation system that will carry humans into deep space. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden announced today that the system will be based on designs originally planned for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. Those plans now will be used to develop a new spacecraft known as the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV).
"We are committed to human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit and look forward to developing the next generation of systems to take us there," Bolden said. "The NASA Authorization Act lays out a clear path forward for us by handing off transportation to the International Space Station to our private sector partners, so we can focus on deep space exploration. As we aggressively continue our work on a heavy lift launch vehicle, we are moving forward with an existing contract to keep development of our new crew vehicle on track."
Lockheed Martin Corp. will continue working to develop the MPCV. The spacecraft will carry four astronauts for 21-day missions and be able to land in the Pacific Ocean off the California coast. The spacecraft will have a pressurized volume of 690 cubic feet, with 316 cubic feet of habitable space. It is designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the space shuttle.
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2011/may/HQ_11-164_MPCV_Decision.html
Nelson's Email to NASA Safety Office Challenging Orion Safety Release
From: Don Nelson [mailto:danelson@wt.net]
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2011 9:04 PM
To: Burch, Susan (HQ-TD000); Oconnor, Bryan (HQ-GA000)
Subject: Crew Module Safety IssueTo:
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Subject: Crew Module Safety Issue
Recently published statements attributed to NASA state that the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: "designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space Shuttle." Is this statement the position of the NASA's safety oversight authorities? If so, as a retired NASA engineer with extensive experience in the operation of crew modules, I challenge the authenticity of this statement.
While the crew escape tower on the MPCV does provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew escape pods, it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a death trap during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the Russian Soyuz crew module's safety record is not significantly better than that the Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the escape tower (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36119843/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/russians-report-snag-space-safety-system/ ), it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be the fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures are:
· Every crew module flight is a test flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/Russia052208.xml&headline=Soyuz%20Ballistic%20Re-entry%20Explained&channel=space )
· Water landings are an unacceptable dangerous risk to flight and recovery crews. Land landings have the potential expose the crew to fatal high g loads upon impact.
· Crew modules have very limited cross range capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable weather conditions.
· Crew module's notorious reentry errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid access to the crew in dire circumstances.
· Parachutes are known to fail. This is another unacceptable single point failure.
There are too many potential failures with fatal consequences for a crew module to be even considered for 21st century human space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service only because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting body winged runway landing crewed spacecraft (http://en.wordpress.com/tag/kilper/ ). While NASA spends billions developing the MPCV crew module which is nothing more than a political derived government jobs program. Furthermore, the crewed missions proposed for the MPCV can be conducted more efficiently with robotic spacecraft. The silence of the NASA crew safety oversight authorities on the safety of the MPCV is a deadly silence. Will you remain silent?
Don A. Nelson
Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
Alvin TX
NASA SAFETY OFFICE REPLY: BRYAN O'CONNOR , CHIEF dated 6/16/2011.
From: "Oconnor, Bryan (HQ-GAOOO)" <bryan.oconnor@nasa.gov>
To: "Don Nelson" <danelson@wt.net>; "Burch, Susan (HQ-TDOOO)" <susan.burch@nasa.gov>
Cc: "Cooke, Douglas (HQ-BAOOO)" <douglas.cooke-1 @nasa.gov>; "Wilcutt, Terrence W. (JSC-NA111)" <terrence.w.wilcutt@nasa.gov>
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 6:40 AM
Don,
I don't know about these statements (or misstatements). I cannot vouch for everything NASA people have said over the past few years about risk, but there is nothing official out of NASA saying Orion or MPCV must be ten time safer than shuttle for ascent or entry. The level 1 requirements set for Cx included a requirement that the PRA show total ascent risk to be 1/1000 in the mean, and same for entry. Those numbers represent somewhere between half and 1/3 the risk of shuttle for the same phases of flight.
At PDR, the Cx design PRA estimate was better than the requirement for ascent and not there yet for entry, but they had some design changes, including improvements in landing system failure tolerance they were looking at to get the entry PRA to 1/1000.
We don't have a set of level 1 requirements yet for the next NASA developed human system, but we do plan to use the Cx numbers above as part of our human rating requirements set for commercial crew to ISS. I agree this will be a challenge for any capsule for all the reasons you give if not more.
As for my community's silence on this matter, I normally don't comment on unsubstantiated rumors floating around the internet, but be assured I have a voice and an audience within NASA, and I will not hold my tongue if I think we are doing something that puts our crews in an unacceptable risk posture.
Best,
O'C
Entry Module Failures:
Strato Lab V – Crewman drowned during ocean retrieval.
Mercury Liberty Bell 7 – Lost capsule but save crewman during ocean retrieval.
Voskhod 2 — The service module failed to detach for some time, but the crew survived.
Soyuz 1 – Cosmonaut killed on landing. The attitude control system failed while still in orbit and later parachutes got entangled during the emergency landing sequence (entry, descent and landing (EDL) failure).
Soyuz 5 — The service module failed to detach, but the crew survived.
Soyuz 11 – Three cosmonauts died from asphyxiation caused by module leakage during entry.
Mars Polar Lander — Failed during EDL. The failure was believed to be the consequence of a software error.
Soyuz 23 – Had near disastrous landing on icy lake.
Soyuz TM-5 – Problem with deorbit engine…computer failure.
Soyuz TMA-1 - Ballistic entry occurred…technical malfunction landed 300 mile off course.
Genesis — The parachute failed to deploy due to a G-switch having been installed backwards.
Soyuz TM-10 – Ballistic entry occurred… The Soyuz propulsion module failed to separate properly.
Soyuz TM-11 – Same problem as on TM-10…. Manufacturing errors suspected.
The failure history of reentry modules repeats itself because each flight is a test flight subjected to manufacturing errors. The only way to insure any improvement in astronaut safety is to provide crew escape pods and that is only available on an automated space shuttle.
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