Tuesday, June 18, 2013

Fwd: Gatestone Update :: Harold Rhode: And the Winner is... Iran's Nuclear Program, and more



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From: "Gatestone Institute" <list@gatestoneinstitute.org>
Date: June 18, 2013 3:13:07 AM GMT-06:00
To: bobbygmartin1938@gmail.com
Subject: Gatestone Update :: Harold Rhode: And the Winner is... Iran's Nuclear Program, and more
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And the Winner is... Iran's Nuclear Program

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Khamene'i has again proven what a great master strategist he is. He has succeeded in pacifying the West and his own people, thus buying the time his scientists need to complete his nuclear project.

The Iranians are the best strategists in the Middle East, better than those in the West, and the reason the Iranians constantly succeed in out-maneuvering the West.

In the West, we constantly look for ways not to engage in military conflict; the Iranians are more than willing to offer us those ways. We will almost assuredly give the new president Hasan Rouhani time to "consolidate" his position, thereby granting Iran even more time to develop its nuclear weapons capability. That is the meaning of this Iranian presidential "election."

Of the 686 men who wanted to run for president, the Guardian Council, totally under Khamene'i's control, chose eight candidates. All of them clearly supported Khamane'i's continued rule, which so many of the Iranian people, including senior clerics, loathe. So the choice for Iranian voters was not between candidates with widely differing views. Nevertheless, within that narrow framework, there were differences. Whoever the people actually voted for (we have no way of knowing how free and fair the election was), this result was one of the best of all possible outcomes -- for the Iranian regime.

Since Rouhani spoke "moderately" during the campaign and had a previous reputation for being "moderate," having him win almost guaranteed that the Iranian people -- who came out into the streets after the previous elections were stolen from them -- would not this time protest the election results. Rouhani's "election," therefore, pacifies the reformers who clearly will not demonstrate against him, thereby sparing the Iranian regime having to suppress, arrest, and murder people, actions which had horrified the international community.

Moreover, the West could lull itself into believing that since Rouhani is a "moderate," maybe he is someone we can "deal with." The election result, therefore is huge win for Khamene'i and his clique, and a defeat for the West, Israel, and the Iranian people.

* * *

What can we learn from past experience about dealing with the results of this "election"?

During the early stages of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, we negotiated with the then Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, even though anyone who understood the Iranian revolution would have realized that Bani Sadr, despite his title as President, had no power. The real and only power was Ayatollah Khomeini, called the rahbar (guide or leader). Probably the best translation of that word into any Western language is the German word Führer, the term the Germans used to describe Adolf Hitler.

Khomeini, Iran's Führer, hated us. But we in the U.S. ignored him and concentrated our negotiating efforts on Iran's President Bani Sadr. After all, having had a president by then for almost 200 years, we knew what powers a president had. We consequently ascribed those same powers to Iran's president. We negotiated with him -- but he was powerless to make decisions. Only Khomeini could decide. So while we wasted time, we handed Iran a huge victory. During that period, the U.S constantly make concessions to the Iranian regime. In Middle Eastern terms, these enabled Iran to shame the U.S., and consequently gain huge numbers of supporters -- both Shi'ites and Sunnis -- throughout the Muslim world.

That situation is almost the exactly the one we face today. Just as with Khomeini, Khamene'i is today the only decision-maker in Iran. The Iranian president is nothing more than a figurehead who carries out of the will of the rahbar, or suffers the consequences of not carrying it out.[1]

By pinning our hopes on President Rouhani, and parsing his every word, we will find ways countless to give him time to "consolidate his power," as if he really has power, while we will be less demanding of Iran as it races to cross the nuclear threshold.

Most likely, we get the same results as we did when we negotiated with Bani Sadr. We will therefore almost assuredly give Iran the time it needs to cross the nuclear threshold. Just as with Bani Sadr, we will ignore the fact that he is basically powerless and that it is only Khamene'i who rules the country.

Making Rouhani the president was a brilliant strategic move for Khamene'i -- not just to pacify the West, by also to pacify the Iranian people, who want nothing more than Iran to be accepted as a normal country and regain the international standing it had before the Islamic revolution.

Rouhani's more religiously "moderate" rhetoric led the Iranian people to believe he would be able to negotiate Iran out of the catastrophic economic reality they face. So the "reformers" pin their hopes on him, instead of going out into the streets and demonstrating against him and the regime, as they did after Iran's previous presidential "election."

So Khamene'i has again proven what a great master strategist he is. He has succeeded in pacifying the West and his own people, thus buying the time his scientists need to complete his nuclear project. This is, in short, a "win" for Khamene'i and a "lose" for the West, Israel, and the Iranian people who have shown many times how much they want to be rid of the regime's tyranny.


[1] Bani Sadr eventually escaped Iran partially because he realized he was powerless. Subsequent Iranian presidents have realized that they either bow to the will of the rahbar or suffer the consequences. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's outgoing President, tried to do things his own way, but was humiliated by Iran's governmental system, controlled by Khamene'i. Ahmadinejad was hauled before the Iranian parliament, then publicly questioned and humiliated. It remains to be seen how the newly "elected" Iranian President Rouhani will handle similar situations.

Related Topics:  Iran  |  Harold Rhode


Beheading, According to the Koran

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Saladin even ordered each cleric in his army personally to behead at least one knight. We should expect no less gruesome a fate than the Knight warriors of Christendom, the townspeople of Otranto or British Sergeant Lee Rigby.

"So when you meet in Jihad in Allah's cause those who disbelieve, smite their necks till when you have killed and wounded many of them…"

— Surat 47, al-Qital (The Killing), Ayat 4

The May 12 canonization by Pope Francis of more than 800 Catholics martyred -- by decapitation -- by Turkish invaders in Otranto, Italy in 1480, and the May 22 beheading of a British soldier in London, recall an event in the life of medieval Muslim hero Saladin.

Saladin has long been romanticized -- by Western biographers, Hollywood producers, and "anxious-to-please" Christians -- as a paragon of chivalrous virtue. England's King Richard, leader of a Crusade that failed to recapture Jerusalem from Saladin, often suffers in comparison to his contemporary Muslim rival, Saladin.

In recalling Saladin, it might be helpful to highlight the long-standing theological sanction given beheading as the preferred method of executing non-Muslim combatants. The historical Saladin was not only warrior, statesman, and scholar, but also a religious zealot.

Following a decade-long consolidation of power in North Africa, the Levant, and Yemen, Saladin adopted the role of liberator of the Holy Land from Euro-Christian fiefdoms. The most persistent, powerful obstacles to his religious quest were the Knight Orders of Christendom. Saladin apparently first intended to vanquish the fighting skills and intense religiosity of the Knights Templar and the Knights of St. John Hospitallers. Saladin had vowed an oath to purify Arab lands "from these two monster orders." On July 4, 1187, on a Galilean plain near the town of Hattin, history provided Saladin with his opportunity.

Saladin's army decisively defeated the Crusaders at Hattin, ultimately making possible the capture of Jerusalem by Muslim forces. After his impressive victory over the out-numbered, out-generaled Crusaders, Saladin singled out for special treatment the approximate 230 Knights Templar and Hospitallers who had surrendered. With religious ritual, Saladin choreographed the mass execution of these prisoners of war. He even ordered each cleric in his army personally to behead at least one knight. Only a few prisoners saved themselves by "converting" to Islam.

This ritual purging of the Muslim-claimed Holy Land should be understood by us infidels as an event theologically approved by the "eternal" Koran itself. Over the centuries, several Muslim commentators have commented on beheadings' psychological impact upon their enemy's fear factor and will to resist, as stated by the Koran:

"I will cast terror into the hearts of those who have disbelieved, so strike them over the necks and smite them over all their fingers and toes"

— Surat al-Anfal (The Spoils), Ayat/Verse 12.

When the epithet of "Zionist-Crusader Alliance" is ascribed to military cooperation between Israel and the United States, we should expect no less a gruesome fate than did British Afghanistan War veteran Sergeant Lee Rigby, the townspeople of Otranto, or the Knight warriors of medieval Christendom.

Dr. Lawrence A. Franklin served as the former OSD Iran Desk Officer, Reserve Attaché to U.S. Embassy Israel.

Related Topics:  Lawrence A. Franklin


Who Is Hassan Rouhani?

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In April 2006, Rouhani was caught on tape, boasting that while talks [on Iran's nuclear program] were taking place, Iran was able to complete installing equipment for the conversion of yellowcake -- a key stage in the nuclear fuel process -- but at the same tine convince the Europeans that nothing was afoot.

The eleventh Iranian elections are over but were not really open and fair. No election can be fair when the candidates have been handpicked and propped up by one man: the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The entire event, mostly a show for international consumption, was orchestrated within a police state. "I recently heard," Khamenei said, "that someone at the U.S. National Security Council said, 'We do not accept this election in Iran.' We do not give a damn."

Khamenei has often said, "Any vote that is cast for the candidates who have been picked, is a vote for the Islamic Republic. In fact all voting is a vote of trust and support for the regime." Iranians who voted were not electing a president but validating the Velayat'eh Faqih (the absolute mandate of jurists).

Iranian media and the internet are totally censored; the actions of the regime's elite never reach the people inside. Additionally, both foreign and domestic media have been banned, with the exception of CNN, who sent American reporters. Part of that coercive measure has included the imprisonment of various Iranian journalists.

Hassan Rouhani, the only cleric among the candidates, is a relic from the early days of the Revolution. His birth name is Hassan Feridoon -- a more Persian name then his Muslim name, Rouhani, meaning spiritual. Since the government takeover of the Islamic Revolution, Rouhani has held multiple positions, including Secretary and Representative of the National Security Council, member of the Assembly of Experts, member of the Expediency Council, President of the Center for Strategic Research, and various positions in the Iranian Parliament. In the early days of the revolution he was put in the position of Military Coordinator where he purged the existing military and replaced them with Khomeini loyalists. During the Iran-Iraq war, he served as Rafsanjani's right hand man.

Khatami and Rafsanjani played a significant role in Rouhani's victory by holding off declarations of support and persuading their actual candidate, Mohammad-Reza Aref, to drop out to avoid a split vote. So as of four days before the actual election day, Rouhani had emerged as the fake-reformist, "moderate" candidate in the race. As the peerless Iranian expatriate journalist, Amir Taheri, has written, "He never reformed anything."

Many reputable Iranian analysts such as Dr. Alireza Nourizadeh, have said, "Rouhani has never been a reformist, however he is supported by some members of the so-called pragmatists, like former Mullah Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Khatami. In fact he is a representative of the Supreme Leaderhip and has always been very close to Khamenei. From that aspect, this election was more like a poll for the regime as it wants to show itself as a populist entity."

As a negotiator, Rohani is triumphantly duplicitous, known to lull his non-Iranian counterparts into a false sense of calm. Despite all the talk that, during his term as a nuclear negotiator, Iran appeared more cooperative with the international community, Rohani bragged about how he had tricked the West. In April of 2006 during a speech at the Assembly of Clerics, Rouhani was caught on tape, boasting that while talks were taking place in Teheran, Iran was able to complete the installation of equipment for conversion of yellowcake -- a key stage in the nuclear fuel process -- at its Isfahan plant, but at the same time convince European diplomats that nothing was afoot. "From the outset," he said, "the Americans kept telling the Europeans, 'The Iranians are lying and deceiving you and they have not told you everything.' The Europeans used to respond, 'We trust them!'"

Khamenei, however, is the master of the tactical retreat; that he agreed to have someone like Rouhani, who has the support of both himself and the reformists, was a delicate ploy in order to soften the ugly realities of the regime, represented by Ahmadinejad over the last eight years. Khamenei's past actions shows that he is able to move forward patiently to regain the various affiliations that he would have lost along the way.

"This was a kind of meager installment in the debt the regime owed the people of Iran, for having committed an act of fraud in the last election," said Iranian filmmaker, journalist and former political prisoner, Mohammad Nourizad, who following the 2009 election protests was arrested and jailed. "In other words, the regime officials envision Rouhani to be a kind of compensation for a liability that they incurred. They owed the people of Iran and the political prisoners are very much a part of that reparation."

During the last 34 years, the regime and its leaders, including Rohani, have been telling the world that Iran has no political prisoners. Now, under the pressure from people in Iran during their political campaigns, the regime and its presidential candidate have been forced to mention for the first time that there are. Shiva Mahboubi, spokesperson for the Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran (CFPPI) said: "Rohani announced that he will release political prisoners and will give freedom to the press. However, Rouhani is a part of the establishment and will not release political prisoners and will not allow any freedom for people or the press."

Hassan Rouhani's son committed suicide in 1991. The official line about his suicide was that he suffered from a broken heart, but Dr. Nourizadeh divulges the existence of a suicide note that read: "I loathe your regime, your lies, your corruption, your religion, your hypocrisy and dissimulation [taqqiyeh]. I am disgusted with having to live in such an environment and have to daily lie to my friend by claiming that my father is not cut from the same cloth as the regime elite and chieftains...and that in reality his heart is with the people, while I know the truth to be otherwise. When I see you kissing the hand of Khamenei, I am nauseated..."

Later, when the massive Tehran University uprisings occurred in 1999, Rouhani, who at the time headed up the Islamic National Security Council, reacted by saying: "These students are too pathetic and worthless for us to have to begin changing our directives. The continuance of this mess is not acceptable for our regime and the people. I issued strict orders against these elements [the students] to confront and severely deal with these opportunists. Wherever they are, we will handle them and suppress them. People will witness what today's security and disciplinary forces, the heroic members of the Basij (auxiliary militia) will do to these rabble-rousers and thugs, if they dare to imagine that they can continue their so-called peaceful campaign. The agent that has united our people today, is simply indestructible; that agent is Islam and Islamic rule which is the absolute symbol of the Supreme Leadership."

One wonders how a man who had this reaction to the youths of a country, means to "lead" it.

Related Topics:  Iran  |  Banafsheh Zand

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