NASA budget

SPACE NEWS Feb. 25, 2013

 

NASA's Vision and Upcoming Budget Decisions

                               O. Glenn Smith

 

The problem staring us in the face is the NASA budget, which is likely to be soon reduced overall by 8 to 10% percent, or up to $1.8B billion. This poses a real dilemma for NASA's future. We might see three major options:

å a. Cut every line item 8-10% to 10 percent. This looks to likely would be catastrophic to science/robotic exploration, aeronautics, the IinternationalSspace Sstation (ISS) and Hhuman Sspace Eexploration (HSE), nearly all spent on SLS/Orionthe Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and Orion crew capsule. This looks to be a very bad option, but some in Washington could find this an apparently it an easy way out. Unfortunately, not being cost-effective and having no real mission, SLS probably would face cancellation in a few years anyway. They should listen to the Augustine Committee about the critical requirement to match programs with available funds.

å b.  Defer all HSE human space exploration indefinitely, and .  Rrestrict NASA HSE efforts in this area to nebulous and wasteful "technology development." This is essentially what OMB/OSTP the White House first proposed in 2010, and then backed off amid severe criticism and agreed with the Senate to add SLS/Orion. This option would mean the downfall of U.S. world leadership in space.

å c. Cancel the single most expensive program — the unaffordable and unneeded SLS/Orion, which would cost nearly $4B billion per year for the next 20 to 30 years (multiply that out), and, not being cost-effective and having no real mission, would probably need to be cancelled anyway, sometime in the next 2 to 4 two to four years. Funds freed would be used in developing an HSE Ggateway Bbase for human space exploration at the Lagrange point L2 in orbit around the mMoon, and in preparing an alternate heavy-lift vehicle (Falcon 9H Heavy or Delta 4H Heavy). No reductions would be necessary in Sscience and Rrobotic Eexploration or in other important NASA programs.

There are many well-known and valid reasons why that the SLS/Orion program is considered unaffordable. Independent cost assessments have affirmed that the program is significantly under-funded, especially in the years beyond 2016. The SLS/Orion is quite similar to a major part of the cancelled Constellation program that the Augustine Committee 2009 Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, chaired by Norm Augustine,estimated would need an additional $3 Bbillion per year for many years. Washington should listen to the Augustine committee about the critical requirement to match programs with available funds.

The giant SLS has no mission today and would not be needed for some 30 years, and perhaps not even then. A Ggateway HSE Bbase at L2 could be supported with launchers we now have or will probably have soon at relatively low cost. Falcon 9H Heavy and/or Delta 4H Heavy have been analyzed in the past by NASA technical experts, and look practical, even without depending on a fuel depot. An ISS Exploration Ggateway Bbase at L2 is compatible with a long-range plan for HSE human space exploration development (incremental, cumulative, developing synergism between robotic and human projects, and adjusting schedule to match available funds). 

The Orion was designed to be part of Constellation ("Apollo onSsteroids"). It is too big, heavy and expensive for the function envisioned as part of an L2 Ggateway Bbase, or any other months-long mission beyond L2. It's real function in an HSE a human space exploration program is to carry the crew to and from LEOlow Earth orbit, and to/from a habitat beyond LEOlow Earth orbit. At other times, the spacecraft can be docked to the habitat and be dormant, much like the current Soyuz at theISSinternational space station. A total systems engineering study is needed to compare a slimmed-down Orion with an enhanced commercial crew spacecraft.

The planned Orion one-shot test mission scheduled for 2014 would be a way to essentially waste more than half a $Bbillion dollars, while returning very little value. This version of Orion would not contain most critical crew support provisions. It would return from beyond LEO low Earth orbit at a velocity well short of entry velocity from lunar orbit, and thus be an incomplete test of the heat shield. In addition to the cost of a Delta 4H Heavy launcher, a goodly amount of one-time integration effort would be necessary. This appears to be an expensive stunt to falsely indicate real progress.

A large technology development program would have significant problems. After several years and hundreds of $millions of dollars spent developing and flying a demonstration, even if successful, an additional long development cycle would be necessary to design and develop the real thing to use in a real mission. Supposedly, technology development efforts would be managed by technology specialists — whose unspoken real objective would be to uncover and promote additional technology development projects and demonstrations. If we must do technology development for its own sake, projects must be small and "proof- of- concept" only. Larger technology projects should be managed by a program manager with a real mission to accomplish, and designed to be a directly useful element in a real mission.

One overhanging long-range issue is the future of the ISSinternational space station. Should the USA United States continue to support ISS it to the tune of about $3B billion a /year indefinitely? If not, NASA should consider transitioning the ISS space station's function, or actual parts of it, to the L2Ggateway Bbase. International Ppartners might like this if they can be a part of the L2 Ggateway Bbase. NASA could transition LEO low Earth orbit operations and costs to commercial interests.

Fast-forward about four years. The SLS/Orion projects will have been cancelled after falling behind schedule and facing ballooning costs, suffering the same fate as the Constellation Pprogram. The USAUnited States will have spent tens of $ Bbillions of dollars on Ares/SLS/Orion with no progress inHhuman Sspace Eexploration, and may have lost space leadership to China or other nations.

Imagine instead, if part of planned funding for the giant SLS/Orion is were used to prepare to move the ISS international space station to an L1 or L2 orbit around the mMoon. , wWe could have the ISS Moonship Enterprise soon on its way to a stable lunar orbit around the moon. The trip may take several years via proven ion propulsion. On the way, periodic visits by crewswill would keep the Moonship spacecraft supplied and in working order, much like the ISS space station is maintained today.

When it gets there, it will would become the ISS Exploration Gateway Base, where in time, assembly of exploration missions to the lunar surface and outward can could be conducted within practical U.S. and IinternationalPpartners' future budgets and development schedules. No technological breakthroughs or new launcher developments will would be necessary.

Most importantly, NASA technical expertise must be brought into policy decisions. NASA was consulted only briefly, and without field centers' technical expertise, in the FYfiscal 2010 abrupt policy change. NASA The agency was also not consulted in a meaningful way when the law was passed adding the unaffordable SLS/Orion without the budget to pay for it. Even today, it is very unfortunate that NASA technical experts are not permitted to study alternatives to SLS/Orion. We must TURN NASA EXPERTS LOOSE turn NASA experts loose to help solve these overriding issues and permit NASA the agency to establish a vision, accomplish as much as possible in the upcoming years, and do it within a necessarily restricted budget.

 

O. Glenn Smith is a former manager of shuttle systems engineering at NASA's Johnson Space Center.

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